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ever, be directly nullified, it appears that strict application of
G.C.M. 23623, supra, would exact hardship upon the small operator experiencing bona fide loss in this type of transaction, and that
it would be detrimental to the policy adopted by Congress toward
encouragement of the development and expansion of this vital
industry.
The application of the "intent" theory, which gained tacit
approval in the Choate case, supra, would seem to be the soundest
approach in the determination of whether given deductions, occasioned by "sales" involving production payments, are to be permitted. as valid economic losses, or to be disallowed as merely
theoretical "losses."
C. H. H. II
LkBoR LAW-INJUNCnONs OF STRIKS AFFEcrING NAnTONAL
HviH AND SArry.-The United States sought and obtained in

the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania an
injunction under the National Emergency provisions of the Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), §§ 206-210, 208,
29 U.S.C. 176-180, 178 (1947), against the continuation of an
industry-wide strike in the basic steel industry. United States v.
United Steelworkers, 178 F. Supp. 247 (W.D. Pa. 1959). The
Court of Appeals affirmed. United Steelworkers v. United States,
271 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1959). On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed. Held, by eight justices in a per curiam
decision which was amplified by a separate opinion filed later by
Franldurter and Harlan, JJ., that the judgement below was amply
supported by the district court's finding that the strike's continuation imperiled the national safety and that the statute as applied
was not violative of the constitutional limitation prohibiting courts
from exercising powers of a legislative or executive nature. Douglas, J., dissented, stating: (1) that the case should be remanded
to the district court for particularized findings as to how the steel

strike imperiled the national health; and (2) that since equity
traditionally exercises jurisdiction, it should not be held that the
only way to remove the danger to national safety is to issue a
blanket injunction in the absence of a showing that a partial reopening would not be sufficient. United Steelworkers v. United
States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1 (Nov. 7, 1959), 80 Sup. Ct. 177 (Dec. 7, 1959).
The National Emergency provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act (hereinafter designated L.M.R.A.), § § 206-210,
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29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1947), have been invoked fifteen times,
including this dispute. The industries involved have been: atomic
energy (three times), meatpacking, bituminous coal (three times),
telephone, maritime longshoremen (three times), a single pipe
manufacturing plant, and steel (twice). Not all of the above
named disputes have reached the court system because the initiation of the proceeding under section 206, supra, precipitated an
immediate settlement between the parties, presumably to avoid
further government intervention. HAND R & HAys, LABoR LAw
558, 561 (3d ed. 1959).
The provisions of the L.M.R.A. treated in the principal case
are summarized as follows. The President is authorized to appoint
a board of inquiry which is required to report to him in regard
to the dispute. Upon receiving the report of the board of inquiry,
the President may direct the Attorney General to seek an injunction to terminate the work stoppage. When the injunction order
is issued, the President is required to reconvene the board of
inquiry, which then must report to the President at the end of a
sixty day period regarding the status of the dispute. Within the
succeeding fifteen days, the National Labor Relations Board is
required to take a secret ballot among the employees involved,
upon the question whether they wish to accept the employer's
last offer. Results of the ballot must be certified to the Attorney
General within five days thereafter. The Act accordingly contemplates an eighty day "cooling off" period. If the dispute is not
terminated at the expiration of the period, the injunction order
must be dissolved, the President is required to submit a final report
of the matter to Congress, and the parties are theoretically free
again to resort to tests of economic strength. See e.g. United
States v. United Steelworkers, 202 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1953), affirming United States v. American Locomotive Co., 109 F. Supp. 78
(1952); United States v. United Mine Workers, 89 F. Supp. 187
(D.D.C. 1950), appeal dismissed and aff'd, 190 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir.
1950); United States v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 78 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1948); United
States v. United Mineworkers, 77 F. Supp. 568 (D.D.C. 1948), aff'd,
177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.); cert. denied 338 U.S. 871 (1949).
Although the provisions of the Act have been invoked several
times, they had not been considered by opinion by the Supreme
Court until the principal case. Exemplified by fhe instant case,
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there are apparent two main approaches to the Act and its review
by the federal courts.
L The ConstitutionalApproach. These issues were dispensed
with easily by the Court and may be discussed in view of the
previous adjudications of the lower federal courts since the enactment of the L.M.R.A., and from equity precedents in general.
The petitioner had assailed the district court's right to exercise jurisdiction granted by § 208 of the L.M.R.A. to enjoin strikes
such as this as not being a "case" or "controversy", and thus not a
grant of jurisdiction within the meaning of art. 3, § 2 of the Constitution. The courts, as noted in the concurring opinion of the
principal case, have long had the power to issue injunctions to
abate public nuisances at the suit of the government. Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). A strike or
lockout endangering the public health or safety comes within the
purview of a suit to abate a public nuisance. Challenges of statutory limitation on the right to strike and their validity has been
upheld. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926). Even apart from
statute, the federal powers to invoke the injunctive process to halt
strikes affecting the public at large exists. In re Debs, 158 U.S.
564 (1895).
A.related ground of attack upon the question whether a strike
or lockout presents a justiciable controversy when it is a peaceful
one, received rather summary treatment in United States v. InternationalLongshoremen'sAss'n., 116 F. Supp. 262 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
The court held that jurisdiction under National Emergency to
grant an injunction against interested parties to a dispute did not
depend upon the existence of a justiciable controversy with respect
to the parties sought to be enjoined, rather it is the fact that the
public interest was invaded by the private parties which gives the
court its jurisdiction.
In United States v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemens Union, supra, the National Emergency injunction was
also attacked on the ground that it violated constitutional amendments relation to freedom of speech, due process of the law, and
involuntary servitude. The district court held that such argument
was not valid because the injunction was directed at the union as
the offending party, and it only incidentally affected the individual worker. This view was elaborated upon and followed in an
excellent opinion by Judge Keech in a later case affecting the
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bituminous coal industry. United States v. United Mine Workers,
89 F. Supp. 187, supra.
II. The Labor Relations Approach. It is to be noted at this
point that a consideration of the principal case in light of principles of labor law cannot proceed wholly within the bounds of
judicial decision. This area of substantive law, being for the most
part statutory and of relatively recent origin, is passed upon only
incidentally by the courts. Considerations, though valid, will not
be treated by the courts if they involve matters of policy or regulation which are properly within the scope of the executive or legislative branches of government. Policy arguments addressed to the
wisdom of strike-injunctions recognized by the Court in the principal case, e.g. 80 Sup. Ct. 1, at 3, "the effect of a labor injunction
on the collective bargaining processes . .

.

. availability of other

remedies to the executive ... ." were not deemed controlling in
considering whether the lower courts were correct in the issuance
and affirmance of the injunction.
Pursuant to the judiciary's blatant abuse of labor's rights in
the early part of this century, which was vociferously documented
by experts in the field, see generally FRANi -m= & GREENE, Tim
LAoR INJUNcrON (1930), Congress passed remedial legislation. The

Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 100 (1932) inhibited the indiscriminate use and misapplication of injunctions and thus enhanced
labor's economic bargaining power. The L.M.R.A., however, revested the federal district courts with power to grant injunctions
in limited situations arising out of labor disputes by creating an
exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. United States v. United
Steelworkers, 202 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1953).
Upon proper finding before the district courts in their capacity
as triers of fact, the courts are impressed with the mandatory duty
to enjoin a strike or lockout affecting an entire industry or substantial part thereof, when such will, if permitted to continue, endanger the national health or safety. United States v. International
Longshoremeis Assn., 116 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. N.Y. 1953). It
would appear from the above that the courts have dispelled anticipated fears that the Act would represent a swing back to the
early days of issuance of injunctions which had aborted collective
bargaining in the ordinary employer-employee relationship.
Another early reaction to the L.M.R.A. National Emergency
provisions was that it could be construed as a basis to support the
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seizure of an industry by the President because a dispute constituted a threat to the nation's welfare. Speculations of this nature
were conclusively settled by the Court in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube v. Sawyer, 243 U.S. 579 (1952) (Holding that seizure could
not be justified without statutory authority and that the L.M.R.A.
furnished none).
A criticism of the principal case voiced by Mr. Justice Douglas,
and raised in those cases previously tried in regard to the Act, was
that -the district court should have some discretion as to the form
of relief to be issued in the best interests of adjudicating each fact
situation. Rehmus, Operation of the National Emergency Provisions of the L.M.R.A. of 1947, 62 YALE L.J. 1047 (1952). Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan, concurring in the instant case, distinguished
the L.M.R.A., section 208 from section 205(a) of the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942 where the remedy of injunction was
discretionary with the court since that act stated, "a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order be granted."
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944); whereas, the specific
words of the L.M.R.A. § 208 are mandatory upon the court if the
facts found and evidence adduced presents a national emergency.
From the preceding comparison of statutory construction, the
Court inferred that authority to issue discretionary limited injunctions must come from the policy makers.
Coupled with specific criticism above, a general broadside of
the following nature has been leveled at the National Emergency
provisions by many writers. It is said that the public interest in
regards disputes of national implication cannot be effectively served
so long as private parties can further their singular interests by
forcing Federal Government's recourse to the drastic emergency
provisions. Experience has shown that these provisions, designed
for timely settlement as well as the prevention of the crippling of
the economy, and damage to defense production, are being used
to advantage by either Labor or Management (depending upon
the facts of the particular dispute) to gain their economic objective
without bargaining, while at the same time delaying settlement
for the eighty-day period. See e.g., HArNLm & HAYS, supra, at
561; Forkosch, Equity Versus Taft-Hartley Injunctions, 24 TEmp.
L.Q. 277, 294 (1950-51). Consequently, it would appear that a
preordained policy, codified into narrow legislative provisions,
has impeded rather than facilitated timely and beneficial settlements of National Emergency disputes. The L.M.R.A. represents a
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type of legislation which is anticipatory in nature wherein the
parties affected fully realize the results that will follow when the
provisions of the Act are invoked against them. This, as previously
noted, has given a measure of protection and advantage to one of
the private parties rather than the public. The district courts are
then called upon, apparently not to adjudicate the rights of the
parties and to grant appropriate relief, but merely to "rubber
stamp" administrative determinations. To forestall such results in
the future it is suggested that the L.M.R.A. be amended. Massachusetts has enacted a type of legislation of an ad hoc nature
which appears to produce a more desirable settlement of disputes
affecting the public interest.
The Massachusetts legislation places the power of discretionary
action upon the parties in dispute in the executive branch of the
government. The legislation grants the governor wide discretion
in approach to settlement, even to the extreme of government
seizure. Under this legislative approach the parties in dispute do
not anticipate the full import of their actions. Consequently, the
vague threat of active government intervention, without warning,
has proved conducive to speedy settlement of injurious strikes or
lockouts. For a full discussion of this legislative approach, authored
by the late Sumner Slichter of Harvard, see Schultz, The Massachusetts Choice-of-Procedures Approach to Emergency Disputes,
10 IND. & LAB. BEL. Rv. 359 (1956-57).
Until such time as Congress shall legislate a different approach
in regards National Emergency disputes and concomitant protections of both the public interest and that of free collective bargaining, the mandate, once requisite findings are made, is upon
the judiciary to act as surely as it is upon the interests limited
by the issuance of the injunction to acquiesce.
C. H. H. II
CoNDmoN
ML=
Oi. Am GAs-M~mAI RoYALrY Dmz-Iu
Tumv
THAT TEMPOBARY CEssATION OF PRoDucrioN AFrR FiuX
Dos NoT TmnmNAT BIGHT To RoYATrs.-Petitioners held a
term royalty deed entitling them to mineral royalties for fifteen
years and so long thereafter as minerals were produced in paying
quantities. Paying production was continuous beyond the primary
term, until two law suits between respondents and a certain lessee,
plus concomitant mechanical failures, caused a cessation thereof
for 174 days. Petitioners sued for a declaratory judgment that their
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